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Marxism and Moralism*
EVAN SIMPSON Victoria University of Wellington
Moral philosophers continue to divide on the conundrum of Marx and mo-
rality—how a ferocious moral critic of nineteenth-century capitalism could
also denounce morality as an ideological snare and delusion. In Marxism
and the Moral Point of View, Kai Nielsen brings together many years of
thought on both terms of the question, rightly seeking a balance between
Marx's moralism and Marx's anti-moralism.
Marx's historical materialism poses a general problem for the validity of
moral conceptions. This theory explains successive stages of civilization, or
class society, as effects of developing productive forces. Each successive set
of economic forces is favourable to the dominance of a particular social
class, whose social control is reinforced by the dominant ideas of the epoch.
Thus, Aristotle's notion of natural slaves justified the privileges of citizens
in a society one or two steps removed from subsistence, while the notion of
freedom of choice justifies the privileges of capital in a system of organiza-
tion which responds to meeting wants. In retrospect we can always see such
justifications of class relationships as reflections of a system of production
rather than as defensible moral claims, so that fully understanding these jus-
tifications dissolves reasons for accepting them. In this way, historical mate-
rialism includes a sociology of moral beliefs which undermines them and
explains why Marx could regard them as nonsense.
However, this description is too coarse to rule out the validity of any
moral belief whatever. As Nielsen notes, the unacceptable beliefs are those
whose function it is to disguise class interest as moral truth. It does not fol-
low from the fact that certain conceptions of natural inferiority and individ-
ual freedom have this function that moral beliefs lacking this role also lack
validity. We can, he says, identify many "moral truisms" without pretend-
ing that there are eternal moral principles or supposing that moral ideas are
dominant factors in epochal change (p. 3, 34, 132, 214, 233). This seems
right. Since historical materialism is a theory of such change, we might ex-
pect it to have little to say about these truisms. To rule them out as nonsense
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would be to say much more than the theory warrants. While Marx's thesis
is not simply or primarily moral (p. 1, 14), then, it seems fully consistent
with maintaining that "ordinary human feelings" and "commonsensical
moral beliefs" are valid (p. 33), that these beliefs, unlike ideololgical be-
liefs, are not inherently conservative (cf. p. 122), and that they will survive
class society (p. 265). The ideology of freedom and equality which helps to
sustain capitalism will disappear, but freedom and equality are clearly good
things when understood as conditions of self-respect and mature friendship
rather than as myths that sustain the wage relationship. They belong to non-
political morality and can be expected to remain in any post-political soci-
ety.
Marxists need not hesitate, therefore, to recognize manifest moral tru-
isms. Amongst the obvious goods Nielsen places health, pleasure, auton-
omy, satisfaction (p. 10); equality, fraternity, mutual respect (p. 33); self-
respect, happiness (p. 127); reciprocity, freedom (p. 200); and friendship
(p. 267). There are equally obvious evils: suffering, degradation, servitude,
powerlessness (p. 10); poverty, exploitation, and the crippling of human
personality (p. 127). This is a mixed bag, but the various goods are, in Niel-
sen's view, united by a common property. Unlike ideological beliefs, these
valid claims are not extinguished by the knowledge of the causes of our be-
liefs (p. 35, 146). They survive such tests as Nielsen's wide reflective equi-
librium or Richard Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy.
This notion of moral truisms is much less perspicuous than it initially
seems. In order to appreciate this, let us consider Nielsen's portrait of class
society. Capitalist society in particular dehumanizes labour, causes suffering
and degradation and undermines autonomy (p. 248). It is a contemporary
truism, however, that labour today is in a very different situation from
workers in England's satanic mills. If Marxism is to continue to be of inter-
est it must accommodate this difference. In one way this is easy to do. We
need only say of the relationship between labour and capital what Marx said
of feudal relations in their heyday. The fight between the two great hostile
camps of bourgeoisie and proletariat is in an unexpectedly hidden phase in
which the "naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation" described in the
Communist Manifesto has again been veiled by political illusions. We may
then say that suffering and degradation continue to be experienced but go
unrecognized (p. 165). As soon as we need to unmask exploitation, how-
ever, and convince people that — contrary to their own self-conceptions —
they are suffering and degraded, it becomes problematic how to construe
the moral truisms.
Nielsen wants to avoid the paradox of viewing all thinking as ideologi-
cally distorted (p. 112), but false consciousness goes very deep if we can be
mistaken about truistic goods and evils. If we want to avoid suffering and
degradation in the abstract but do not recognize them in the concrete, it is
not clear what we want exactly. Nielsen's ultimate ideal is for all persons to
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have as much as possible of whatever it is that they want (p. 213), but the
ideal requires that these wants be adequately informed and reflectively
tested. This makes the account suspiciously a priori in conception: if we fail
to recognize the suffering and degradation postulated by the theory and
therefore fail to rebel against them, we must not be adequately informed or
reflective enough. The view becomes unfalsifiable rather than truistic. The
appropriate response to this charge may be that wants are to be examined
through a variety of empirical social theories, but if wants must pass this
kind of test we are again remote from truisms.
Another dimension of the difficulty for moral truisms is evident in the
claim that "the lives of more people become objectively better as we go
through these epochal transformations [ancient, feudal, capitalist, social-
ist]" (p. 132). The standard of objectivity here is the set of possibilities,
created by developing productive forces, for greater human flourishing and
autonomy, but this is an ambiguous standard. It conflicts with familiar argu-
ments about the alienation and meaninglessness typical of capitalistic soci-
ety as evils outweighing the forms of well-being and autonomy the system
provides. The gains our society has made in reducing disease, hunger, pov-
erty and overwork have to be balanced against the losses: the banality of ex-
istence in technological societies, as conservatives may see it, the loss of
"idyllic relations" as Marx and Engels saw it in the Manifesto, perhaps
even "the crippling of human personality." If such gains are ambiguous,
then moral truisms provide no criterion of moral progress. This would help
to explain and support the view that Marx's analysis of capitalism does not
include a system of moral evaluation with which to judge social systems.
Nielsen therefore needs a better argument for his view that "more techni-
cally developed modes of production enable more human beings to more
fully and more equitably satisfy their wants and needs and that gives us
good reason to believe they are also ethically superior" (p. 144).
In spite of these difficulties, it is plausible to say that there are indeed
moral truisms. They may include the existence of specifically human goods
arising in the course of our biological evolution — such as the expressions of
limited altruism we find in feelings of pity and love and the associated de-
sires to relieve suffering and respect the interests of certain others. These
truisms confirm that much suffering is evil, that some mutual respect is
good. They do not express eternal moral principles or bolster classes, as
Nielsen insists truisms should not (p. 148). They concern sub-political rela-
tionships which could occur in a classless society (p. 259). Because these
relationships are compatible with partiality and exclusiveness, they suggest,
as Nielsen does, that various forms of inequality and moral conflict might
remain after class conflict ends (p. 219). Since these occur below the level
of class relationships, Marxism needs to recognize a place for them, as Niel-
sen clearly does in a discussion of Sittlichkeit (p. 265-266). The fact remains
that Marxism has little distinctive to say about them. Those who would
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understand them might better turn to left-communitarians like Charles Tay-
lor and Michael Walzer, who are more interested in the everyday life-world
than in the remoter class struggles which resist moral assessment.
The distinction between moral and class conflict supports a wider separa-
tion between Marxism and moralism than Nielsen is content to allow. This
is perhaps clearest in his appeal for equality. Now, the notion of a class is
notoriously ill-defined (p. 104), but whatever classes are, we can say of
them at least that they have a strong impact on our wants (p. 209), and that
their existence indicates a society lacking in equality in some dimension
(p. 57, 72, 217). Given the presence of equality in Nielsen's table of truistic
moral goods, it should not be a want produced by class relationships but one
which would remain in classless society and provide a reason for seeking
such a society now. It is not clear, though, that we do or will have this desire
or what its object is exactly. As a result, it is also unclear whether the appeal
for equality is a proper element of Marxism or an expression of an inde-
pendent moral theory grafted onto Marxism.
In order to develop this issue and to understand modern class conflict in
relation to moral conflict, we may start with the recognition that the capital-
ist system dissolves an important difference. Useless things become useful
in virtue of a demand having been created for them. The system cannot dis-
tinguish the desires expected of people whose human capacities are fully
developed from objects of arbitrary or manipulated choice. Because no felt
oppression need result we cannot usefully characterize the situation in
psychological terms or expect it to be translated into a social movement. For
the same reason we cannot accurately portray labour as a cohesive group.
The characterization must be more abstract. Social classes are, indeed, best
viewed as abstractions, like logical classes, rather than as conscious entities.
The important markers of capitalist society are not population statistics
(contrast Nielsen, p. 236) but the transfer of wealth from labour to capital, a
system of production oriented to exchange values, the proliferation of use-
less and harmful products, and minimal social control over production. In
this description of the elements of labour and capital we find no reference to
individual inequalities of income and wealth, much less an indication that
the inegalitarian features of the early capitalist system still figure as telling
grounds for criticism. It is, in short, unclear that egalitarianism defines a
central objective of Marxism.
Having said this, it must be acknowledged that people do value equality.
We may see this in experiences of resentment, love and forms of respect for
persons. These values, however, have to do with the microstructure of hu-
man affairs, with the relatively transparent life-world, rather than the macro-
scopic relations (such as the transfer of wealth between classes) which are
identified with the aid of social theories. Such desires for equality have par-
ticular persons as their referents and seem peripheral to the appropriate ob-
jectives of socialism. As we have already noted, these wishes may occur in
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any social system. There will always be occasions for battles for equal
rights and recognition, for these are matters of hermeneutical self-under-
standing rather than reflections of the forces of production.
The claims of equality are again pressing in the case of income and
wealth, insofar as discrepancies in these means of autonomous action frus-
trate conditions of well-being. Nielsen is sensitive to this connection, refer-
ring to "a gestalt of freedom, equality, and reciprocity" (p. 200) in order to
defend equality as an intrinsic good by its connection with other goods. It is
unclear, however, that we need speak of a gestalt here. The argument that a
measure of material equality is a condition of general well-being is very
strong. It, too, can be established independently of Marxian social theory.
Liberals like Rawls are entirely comfortable with it. For this reason there is
no apparent reason for resorting to the obscurity of evaluative gestalts.
Nielsen himself suggests as much when he speculates about the need to sup-
plement communist ideals with egalitarian principles of distribution (p. 92-
93). Here we have distinction rather than gestalt.
These uncertainties and contrary directions are all too characteristic of the
debate about Marxism and distributive justice. The issue cannot be fully
canvassed here, but there is little hope of establishing the need for principles
of justice in classless society. In a moment of carelessness, Nielsen denies
that Marx "thought that the working class would not need principles of jus-
tice in the future communist society" (p. 186). Of course, there is no work-
ing class in classless society. More importantly, in classless society the spe-
cific problem to which, in the Marxian account, principles of distributive
justice respond has been overcome. That problem is the justification of
transfers of wealth from one class to another. It is possible (though optional)
to think of this transfer as unjustified — no one has consented to it — and as
such unjust; but where there are no classes between which such a transfer
may occur no relevant subject of a Marxian justice remains. Differences of
income and wealth may still occur between individuals, as they will wher-
ever there are markets, but this does not reflect the kind of structural prob-
lem that is of primary interest to Marxism, which opposes the market sys-
tem — the dominance of the market in human affairs.
Important issues for Marxists remain when structural questions have been
sufficiently differentiated from moral ones. Among the most pressing is an
account of socialism in which individual advantages are not capable of de-
veloping into structural ones, including an account of the role of exchange
after class society. The vast social experiment now underway in the Soviet
Union does not prove but strongly suggests that markets are essential fea-
tures of well-functioning complex societies. How they may function under
democratic control rather than through the invisible hand, or how they may
be used as a means of exchange while stopping short of a market system, is
among the most pressing questions for radical philosophers. Without a clear
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answer to this question, current developments may be convincingly por-
trayed as the rejection of socialism for capitalism.
To this uncertainty should be added an ambiguity in the notion of social-
ist or communist society. These expressions may refer to a classless society
or to society characterized by solidarity and community. These are differ-
ent concepts, but Nielsen connects them without much argument. In "a so-
ciety which had ended class structures... a sense of social solidarity and
community would develop" (p. 90). What justifies this expectation? In
classless society the zoon politikon will still carry the burden of its biologi-
cal heritage. Human beings may continue to divide into exclusive communi-
ties and competing clans unless prevented from doing so. To suppose in-
stead that a society of friends will develop is to see complex and heteroge-
neous societies as communities writ large. This neglects the difference be-
tween motives which unite us in families, neighborhoods, civic associations
and the like and those that divide us into diverse groups.
If, as suggested earlier, moral truisms and relationships are most clearly
identifiable in the everyday world of human relationships, it is easy to un-
derstand Marxist moralism. One wants to overcome differences between
communities and societies in order to give common moral beliefs a role in
motivating the project of social change and even helping to advance it. But
in spite of Nielsen's best efforts there is no clear evidence that the moral
claims on which people agree favour any social system over others. The se-
rious gap in our understanding of relationships between morally united
communities and social systems warrants caution in conjoining Marxism
with a moral point of view. Doing this may confuse loyalty to community
with obligations to society in a picture of socialist consciousness which has
no real coherence. It may therefore create obscurities which act as obstacles
to social change rather than promoting it. Clarity and progress may be better
served by recognizing that Marxists are as entitled as anyone else to deplore
suffering and other evils while insisting that moralism is distinct from their
social theory.1
Notes
* Kai Nielsen, Marxism and the Moral Point of View: Mortality, Ideology, and Historical
Materialism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). Page references are to this work.
1 This discussion has benefited from responses by Kai Nielsen to an earlier version read on
May 27, 1989, at the annual meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association. It has
also gained from the contribution of my co-symposiast, Derek Allen, and from sugges-
tions by John McMurtry.
